N independent and identically distributed observations of some random variable with a continuous distribution Fare sequentially presented to two players, White and Black. Each player is required to select exactly one observation without recall to rejected observations. As long as both players have not made a selection, White is always given the first option to accept or reject an observation. Both players are given the same information and are aware of the selection made by the other player. The: player selecting the largest number wins the game. This problem is considered for the two cases, when either F is known or unknown. The probability of each player winning and the distribution of the location in the sarnpl.e where selections are made is obtained. Also asymptotic results are derived. The problem is couched in terms of a horse bet.
Introduction
Two punters jointly own a horse called Jerome. Jerome is scheduled to run n races of a fixed length over the ,:ourse of a racing season. Being gentlemen of both a gambling and sporti::lg nature, they agree to make a game of their horse's official racing times. The winner will become sole owner of Jerome.
Over the course of the racing season, the punters will each select exactly one race time of their horse. After each has made a selection, the one with the smallest time, or equivalently the fastest track speed, wins.
The selection process is as follows. The gamblers, call them Mr. White and Mr. Black adjourn to a bar after each race to discuss Jerome's past performances. If neither punter has made a previous selection, then White has the option to take the just completed race time as his selection. If White does not exercise his option, then and only then is Black given the same option.
considered. We will consider the problem of players White and Black both searching for a number larger than that of their opponent.
The problem of a single player attempting to find the maximum of a sequentially presented sequence has an ample literature, see for example; Chow, et al (1964) , Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) and Enns (1975) . Two-person game variations on the secretary problem are given in Fushimi (1981) and Sakaguchi (1980) . Sakaguchi (1978) also explores a two-person sequential decision problem where both players must accept an offer before it is finally taken.
In our paper with two players, the object is not necessarily to pick the best race time, but merely to beat your opponent.
Let Xi' i = 1, ... , n be the average track speed of the horse on the ith race. Assume Xl' ... , Xn are independent and identically distributed random variables with a continuous distribution F(x) = p{X i < x}. We let F(x) be continuous so that the n numbers generated are measurably different.
The problem has several variations, two of which are considered here. If p{w } = p{White wins I n races), then the optimal strategy for the n game involves finding the max-min value of p{w } with respect to the matrices n w ik and b ik respectively where k S i. ,\s we are dealing with a two person zero sum game, the above optimal strategy is equivalent to the Nash equilibrium solution, see J.C. Harsanyi (1967 Harsanyi ( , 1968 ).
Now p{W } may be partitioned in terms of the location of the first track n speed accepted. This is a reasonable partition, because when the first selection is made, the other player will mer,=ly wait until a number exceeding his opponent's choice occurs, if it exists. 
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where 6(n) = O.
(2.3) (2.1) can now be rewritten as:
In (2.3), the remaining strategy for both White and Black commencing at th the running of the (1+1) race is contained in 6(1+1). Reverse sequential optimization beginning at the 1 (n_l)th term yields the desired result. In general from (2.2), minimizing with respect to b 1k , one obtains
Similarly one will find w 1k
Roughly speaking, the former implies that White is more fussy in his choice than Black while the latter implies the converse. Since White has an advantage, the former seems the most reasonable. One can assume the latter and show that it leads to a contradiction. This has been omitted for brevity.
The first possibility is equivalent to saying that w 1k
The consequence of this is that (2.2) can now be written as:
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Incorporating (2.8), one obtains the inequality:
The inequality has been proved for n ~ 9. A similar inequality can be derived for 3 ~ n < 9 which is equivalent to (2.9) in this range. Hence (2.9) is valid for n ~ 3.
The asymptotic probability of White winning was obtained empirically and found to be 
For n ~ 2, the probability that player White wins is:
The optimal strategies in this fini.te extensive game with perfect recall represent the perfect equilibrium point as defined by R. Selten (1975) . As we are dealing with only two players, the D~x-min concept applied to (3.1) is equivalent to finding the perfect equili.brium point.
As in section 2, it can be shown that 10' 1 (x) -1 implies b 1 (x) = 1. This is intuitively reasonable as Black being at a disadvantage will not have a strategy as severe as White's. This allows (3.1) to read: (3. 2)
The optimal strategies are now:
Opt imally , (3.2) becomes: The asymptotic winning probability can be found by allowing u = 1 -p{w }.
n n (3.4) now becomes:
or equivalently:
The sequence un is monotonic and bounded, hence Out of the n races run, it is also of interest to know in advance the likelihood of a selection being made at any particular race.
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where et n +l = 1.
The asymptotic relations are more informative than those just derived. The first limiting moment of X is: It is interesting to note that the density of y = lim Y is discontinuous n--n at Y ~ 1. This is due to the fact that after the first race selection has been made the other player often waits until the last race before a choice is forced on him. For example the second player to choose will select the last race time with probability Copyright © by ORSJ. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited. In summary, if n is large the punters will make their first and second selections on average after 47% and 88% of the races have been run. Mr. White will win Jerome with a probability of 0.67.
Asymptotic Relations
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